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ABSTRACT 
International joint venture (IJV) has become a critical tool for attaining corporate 
goals. Of considerable importance to the success of an IJV is the selection of a 
compatible partner. Decisions regarding partner selection influence the resources 
which are available to the venture, including financial, human and technical 
capabilities. Furthermore, each partner typically participates actively in major 
strategic decisions, which introduces additional complexity to IJV activities. This 
study aimed to identify variables which helped determine the selection criteria which 
firms employed when seeking IJVs. A partner selection model was identified which 
included nine different selection criteria: strategic compability, complementary skills 
and resources, relative company size, financial capability, compability between 
operating policies, compatible management teams, trust and commitment, mutual 
dependency and communication barriers. This study compared the model with the 
approach adopted by a Hong Kong electric utility in selecting partners for its IJVs in 
some developing countries in Asia. The empirical evidence so obtained illustrated the 
general validity of the model, yet improvement can be made to incorporate other 
selection criteria such as the ability to negotiate with the host government which is 
widely regarded as important in structuring IJVs in developing countries. 
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In the past, the study of international business management was substantially devoted 
to the problems of the multinational enterprise as self-contained and internally 
controlled administrative system (Harrigan 1984). The standard operating paradigm 
was a globally optimizing parent supervising a constellation of controlled or fully 
owned foreign affiliates. In this model, the firm's managers are principally occupied 
with issues such as internal efficiency, control, and optimization of a single 
administrative system-albeit one that straddles several nations and markets. 
Devolution to local control is usually shunned and share of ownership and decision 
making is kept within bounds. 
Yet as competition intensifies, alternative modes of international business operations 
such as negotiated arrangements between two or more firms are receiving more 
recognition (Contractor & Lorange 1988). Joint ventures investments entailing shared 
ownership and decision making are increasing in importance for firms operating in 
international markets. With the rise of global economy, an international joint venture 
(IJV) has become a critical tool for attaining corporate goals. Through such a venture, 
firms may reduce risk, attain economies of scale or scope, overcome government-
mandated investment barriers and pool complementary technologies or other 
resources (Harrigan 1985). 
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Many factors can influence performance of an IJV. One factor commonly cited by 
managers with extensive JV experience is the choice of which partner(s) will 
participate in a venture (Tomlinson 1970; Killing 1983; Webster 1989). Decisions 
regarding partner selection influence the resources which are available to the venture, 
including financial, human and technical capabilities. Furthermore, each partner 
typically participates actively in major strategic decisions, which introduces additional 
complexity to JV activities. Thus, partner selection represents a critical strategic 
concern to managers considering use of IJV (Geringer 1988). An incompatible 
partner can lead to unsatisfactory joint venture performance. Studies conducted by 
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells International (1989) suggest that unsatisfactoryjoint venture 
performance ranged from 37% to over 70%. 
The objective of this study was to examine how a Hong Kong electric utility selected 
its partners for its power joint ventures in neighbouring Asian countries. The 
emphasis was on identification of variables which helped determine the selection 
criteria. Previous theoretical studies on this subject were reviewed (Tomlinson 1970; 
Killing 1983; Geringer 1991; et al). A partner selection model proposed by Williams 
and Lilley (1993) was used as a template for contrasting the actual partner selection 
strategies adopted by the Hong Kong utility. The validity of the model was discussed 
at the conclusion of the study. 
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CHAPTERII 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The selection of IJV partners has received limited attention in the joint venture 
literature. In general, prior IJV studies are characterized by either total absence of 
direct reference to partner selection or the issue is accorded only one or a few 
sentences. Even when mentioned, it has usually been in the context of a discussion of 
motives for IJV formation or on subsequent management of the ventures, and 
selection of partners is typically treated as a given (Geringer 1988). The few studies 
that empirically examined partner selection are discussed below. 
Tomlinson's (1970) study of the joint venture process in India and Pakistan was the 
first to identify and focus upon partner selection as a distinct and separable decision in 
the IJV formation process. To help understand partner selection, he tried to identify 
distinct categories of selection criteria. Of the six general categories examined, 
"favourable past association" was cited by respondents as the single most important 
criterion, although it was not sufficient to ensure effective IJV performance. Although 
less important than favorable past asociation, the categories of "facilities," 
"resources," "partner status" and "forced choice" were reported as being of 
approximately equal importance. The final category, "local identity," was found to 
seldom represent a primary criterion for partner selection. 
4 
Tomlinson also investigated the possibility of identifying a set of specific contextual 
variables which might help predict the selection criteria used for particular IJVs. Of 
eight groups of variables examined, parent size, nature of business (categorized as oil, 
chemicals, engineering, electricals, vehicles, metals, and tobacco/food) and the stated 
motivation for IJV formation exhibited the strongest relationships with reported 
selection criteria. Given that the groups of variables were proved to be significantly 
associated and that they could be used to predict at least the direction of variation 
amongst each other, the framework of an operational model was basically established. 
It is possible to enter the heuristic at certain defmed points that will describe the likely 
constitution of the remainder. Similarly, if certain stages or variables are to be 
manipulated, it is possible to predict the effects upon other parts ofthe model. 
Tomlinson's pioneering study provided several valuable insights into the IJV partner 
selection process. However, generalizability of his results may be constrained by 
several factors. First, he focused solely on a convenient sample of forty-nine British 
firms involved in seventy-one IJVs in India and Pakistan, and the ventures were 
almost exclusively oriented toward serving local markets in these countries. In 
addition, the selection criteria categories he developed were not mutually excluseive. 
His data's validity may also be compromised by the likelihood that some interviewees 
had not been involved in partner selection. Since several IJVs were formed twenty or 
more years prior to interviews, accuracy of information regarding selection criteria 
might have been diminished even if the executives had participated in the selection 
process. 
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� Tomlinson and Thompson [1977] examined Canadian firms' IJV experiences in 
Mexico, using data from interviews with forty Mexican and Canadian parent company 
executives, other business people and government representatives. Traits that 
Canadian firms should seek in local partners for IJVs in Mexico were listed, namely, 
financial status, business compatibility, common goals, ability to negotiate with the 
government and compatibility, common goals, ability to negotiate with the 
goveernment and compatible ethics. They also identified traits that Mexican firms 
sought in foreign partners, including financial resources, technology and experience in 
its application, international visibility and reputation, commitment to the Mexican 
IJV, international experience, management depth and the ability to communicate with 
Mexicans. However, the study failed to indicate relative frequency or intensity with 
which specific partner traits werre sought by either Mexican or Canadian firms, or any 
contextual variables wich might influence the criteria which were employed. 
Renforth [1974] examined the IJV process between U.S. mltinational corporations 
and local family or non-family firms in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, to 
determine whether IJVs performed differently if they incorporated local partners with 
distincly different operating characteristics (i.e., family versus non-family firms). The 
international division manager in each U.S. parent's home offices rated eleven 
possible criteria according to their relative impportance in selecting foreign IJV 
partners. Respondents apparently evaluated criteria with respect to hypothetical IJVs, 
which might have introduced some degree of artificiality into the responses. He 
attempted to categorize the criteria based on whether they had strong, mild or no 
influence on the selection decision. However, the categories did not exhibit 
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statistically significant differences in means when evaluated at even a 0.10 level. 
Nevertheless, Renforth noted that IJVs could accommodate the demonstrated 
differences in philosophy, policies or operating procedures which resulted from 
inclusion of a family or a non-family firm partner and still produce equivalent, 
satisfactory results. Except for the family/non-family variable, Renforth did not 
document any explicit attempts to identify contextual variables which might influence 
the relative importance of specific selection criteria. 
Daniels [1971], in an examination of foreign direct manufacturing investment in the 
U.S., also examined investments made via IJVs. Although IJV coverage was 
abbreviated, the results did enable Daniels to conclude that firms sought similarly-
sized organizations as partners. The rationale for this preference was that, by 
selecting a similarly-sized partner, a company "could be assured that the two firms 
placed the joint venture in about the same importance. Furthermore, the two firms 
were then in more nearly equal power positions for bargaining" [Daniels 1971, 60]. 
In contrast to Daniels' findings, Adler and Hlavacek [1976] focused on a non-random 
sample of JVs oriented toward product innovations and formed almost exclusively 
between firms considered "large" and "small" relative to each other. They identified a 
listing of "typical criteria" used to select partners for JVs in this specific type of 
strategic context, including an established marketing/distribution system in the market 
to be served; a salesforce of suitable size, caliber and image calling on specific 
customers; technology to improve on or complement one's own current technology 
base; the kind of personnel needed; a given minimum available financial resource; and 
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relative company size. However, no information was presented regarding relative 
frequency or importance attached to each, nor how these criteria might vary from 
those used for JVs in which partners did not vary widely in size, or which were not 
oriented toward product innovations. 
Awadzi [1987] used a sample of forty manufacturing IJVs in the U.S. to examine the 
relationship between relative bargaining power and partner selection criteria. He 
distilled his analysis down to four selection criteria, each with an hypothesized 
positive relationship with IJV performance: complementarity of partners' resource 
contributions, past association between partners, relatedness of partners' businesses, 
and relatedness of foreign partners' and IJVs’ businesses. Awadzi argued that, "the 
more resources a firm can contribute to ajoint venture, the greater the likelihood that 
it would be selected as a partner"^).32). He did not attempt to identify differences in 
priorities among different resource contributions, or contextual variables which might 
influence these priorities. In addition, he did not clearly identify what specific partner 
contributions would qualify as "complementary resources," instead leaving that 
decision up to the respondents. Except for non-financial complementary resources, 
none of Awadzi's selection criteria evidenced significant positive relationships with 
IJV performance. 
Geringer [1991] introduced a novel typology of selection criteria, one which 
distinguishes between task- and partner-related dimensions of selection criteria. This 
typology explicitly acknowledges those requirements which are common to both IJVs 
and other forms of organization (i.e., the task-related dimensions), as well as those 
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which are unique to a multi-partner organization (i.e., the partner-related dimensions). 
"Task-related" criteria refer to those variables including patents or technical 
knowhow, financial resources, experienced managerial personnel, and access to 
marketing and distribution systems; whereas "partner-related" criteria refer to those 
variables including a partner's national or corporate culture, the degree of favorable 
past association between the partners,compatibility of and trust between partners top 
management teams, and a partner's organizational size or structure. The relative 
importance of a particular task-related selection criterion was shown to be closely 
related to three variables associated with a parent's strategic context. These variables 
included management perceptions of: (1) the extent to which a critical success factor 
(CSF) dimension was critical to the venture's performance, (2) the parent's current 
competitive position vis-a-vis that CSF dimension, and (3) the anticipated future level 
of difficulty to be encountered in internal efforts to achieve a viable competitive 
position on that CSF dimension. 
It can be seen from the above that the topic of "Partner Selection Criteria" has evolved 
to become a significant subject in international business study. The importance of a 
compatible partner to satisfactory IJV performance is more widely recognised. By 
carefully defining a set of appropriate selection criteria, there is a higher likelihood of 
selecting a compatible partner. This is of particular interest to internationally 
operating firms seeking to use IJV as a critical tool for attaining corporate goals. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY - THE PARTNER SELECTION CRITERIA MODEL 
In Chapter III, we will outline a strategic alliance process and describe how the partner 
selection criteria come into play at various stages of the process. The resulting model 
is used as a template for comparing the partner selection strategies adopted by a Hong 
Kong electric power utility. In Chapter IV, we will provide background information 
about the utility being studied in the case - its company profile and business 
objectives. In Chapter V, we will evaluate each of the partner selection criteria in 
sequence and cite examples from the case for illustration. 
Williams and Lilley (1993) developed a partner selection model by placing Geringer's 
criteria (1991) for partner selection in chronological order within the general process 
of developing a strategic alliance. Such a model is intended to provide a tool for 
internationally operating firms in structuring IJVs. They examined the individual 
importance of each criterion in selecting suitable partners, as well as the stages in the 
development process at which they should be considered. Figure 1 illustrates this 
process of developing a strategic alliance. The left-hand column shows a flowchart of 
the stages involved in the development process, and the right-hand column represents 
the partner selection criteria which come into play at particular stages. 
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Strategic Decisions: Figure 1: Strategic Alliance Process 
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In the first stage of the strategic alliance process, it is required to take a strategic 
decision regarding the format of strategic alliance. A number of strategic alternatives 
are available to a company, including wholly-owned subsidiary, merger or strategic 
alliance in the form of IJV. To determine which alternative is the most suitable for a 
certain company, it is necessary to examine the current situation of the company by 
looking at its mission, value potentials and strategic excellence positions/core 
competencies. Based on the long-term contribution to the value of the shareholders, 
the company can evaluate whether an alliance when performing activities together 
with a partner is more advantageous than performing these activities alone or merging 
completely with another company. 
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In the second stage of the strategic alliance process, after deciding to form a strategic 
alliance, configurational aspects like field of cooperation, intensity of cooperation and 
opportunities for multiplication should be analyzed. The field of cooperation is 
specified through the direction of cooperation and value chain activities involved. 
The intensity of a strategic alliance is influenced by the time frame, resource 
allocation and degree of formalization. Opportunities for multiphication refers to the 
possibility of creating a network of companies or business units of diversified firms, 
each contributing specific competencies to the overall system (Bronder & Pritzl 1992). 
If the need for a strategic alliance in the form of IJV has been identified, the 
subsequent problem, in the third stage of the strategic alliance process, is the 
identification and selection of suitable partners. Initially, companies need to be 
concerned with 1) strategic compatibility, 2) complementary skills and resources, 3) 
relative company size, and 4) financial capability. Based on these criteria, potential 
partners are shortlisted for the detailed negotiations. At the detailed negotiation stage, 
which is the fourth stage of the strategic alliance process, the most suitable partner can 
be selected by examining the aspects related to 5) compatibility between operating 
policies, 6) compatibility management teams, 7) trust and commitment, 8) mutual 
dependence, 9) and communications barriers. When a JV agreement has been entered 
into by the partners after negotiations in the final stage of the strategic alliance 
process, the venture goes into the implementation stage. 
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This study compared the above partner selection model with the approach adopted by 
a large Hong Kong electric utility ("the Company") in its selection of partners for its 
IJV power projects in certain developing countries in Asia. In the following chapters, 
we will first provide the background information about the Company and then 
examine its IJV partner selection experience in contrast to the selection criteria 
identified in the above partner selection model. In order to understand the partner 
selection experience of the Company, we have examined certain documents related to 
the Company's annual reports, business plans, project feasibility study reports, 
minutes of meetings, travel notes as well as relevant commentaries by outside 
business analysists and independent advisors. Individually, we have looked at five 
cases ofIJVs in Thailand, Taiwan, Indonesia, Burma and India in which the Company 
has been involved. Also, we have interviewed four of its senior business development 
executives to gain insights into their personal experience in partner selection. 
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CHAPTERIV 
THE HONG KONG ELECTRIC UTILITY - THE CASE STUDY 
The Company's Profile 
The Hong Kong electric utility is the company to be studied. Its business activities are 
divided into two categories. The first is the core electricity generation and supply 
business in Hong Kong, which is regulated by a Scheme of Control Agreement. This 
Agreement , entered into with the Hong Kong Government, govems the financial 
operations of the Company in Hong Kong. Secondly, the Company is an active 
investor and manager in a number of electricity related businesses outside the Scheme 
of Control. These include power projects in the People's Republic of China and 
several other Asian countries. 
The Company is in an exceptionally strong financial position. In 1995, its market 
capitalisation stood at about US$10 billion, net assets were US$2,300 million and 
debt-to-equity was 8.9% only. This financial strength means that the Company is well 
placed to participate in new infrastructure projects across Asia, where the availability 
of adequate finance is often a significant barrier to growth. The Company will, 
however, only commit to major new investments where the returns reasonably reflect 
the risks involved. 
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The Company's primary objective is to maintain its position as a leading Asian utility 
business providing electricity reliably and securely to its customers at the lowest 
reasonable cost. It intends to do so in an environmentally sound manner utilising best 
world practices in respect of its customer services, human resources policies, safety 
standards, and operating efficiency. The Company believes that achieving those 
objectives will be the most effective method of maximising the long-term value of its 
shareholders' equity. 
In Hong Kong, the Scheme of Control provides a predictable and stable environment 
for the operations ofthe Company. For over ninety years, the Company has managed 
its Hong Kong assets in an reasonably efficient and prudent manner to meet the 
electricity needs of Hong Kong's people and businesses. This is the Company's core 
business and this will remain so for the foreseeable future. 
However, Hong Kong is maturing as an economy and accordingly its electricity 
demand grows less rapidly. Hence, the Company can no longer rely on its home 
market to sustain its dynamic growth experienced in the previous decades. For this 
reason, the Company has determined that it can most effectively maximise long-term 
retums to shareholders by expanding into China and other developing Asian countries. 
This expansion is built around a strategy of identifying investment opportunities 
where the Company can most profitably leverage its substantial experience and 
resources. However, identifying and securing high-quality power projects is a 
complex and time-consuming process. Much depends on the credentials and stamina 
that prospective investors bring to the negotiating table. The Company recognises 
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that to succeed in these endeavours, it can not go alone. Instead, strategic alliance in 
the form of IJV with other partners is universally adopted for all of its existing power 
projects. To ensure the performance of these IJVs, the Company attaches great 
importance to the selection of its partners. 
Partner Selection 
The Company's approach to partner selection is described in its business plan. It 
states that partners may be local or foreign, but local partners will generally be 
essential in the Company's projects. As well as providing local knowledge and 
having local contacts, an influential local partner can smooth the path through 
procedural requirements and help resolve political concerns. 
A partner must exhibit qualities and attributes that are complementary to those of 
the Company, and partnership agreements must very clearly allocate functions and 
lead roles between the partners. This is to avoid conflict, especially where partners 
have common skills or attributes. Likewise, all partners must have compatible 
cultures. For example, an organisation that delegates authority will not get on well 
with another where, as in many Japanese and traditionally run companies, all 
decisions are referred to head office. 
The various categories of partners and the criteria by which the Company selects 
local partners are listed below. 
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Categories of Partners 
Utilities A prime objective of the Company will be to develop a 
partnership with a utility in the host country. The 
utility will usually be in a good position to obtain 
permits, resolve political problems and generally help 
the venture through all its stages of development and 
operation. The "utility to utility" relationship will also 
be of comfort to both partners. 
Private Developers Private developers, if chosen with care, can make 
effective partners. They should normally be from the 
host country, and sufficiently knowledgeable and well 
connected to help with any procedural and political 
problems that may arise. They should show long-term 
commitment and not just a wish to make a quick 
profit. 
Equipment Suppliers The Company could, in certain circumstances, enter 
into partnerships with equipment suppliers; for 
example, a supplier could facilitate a project if he has 
strong local contacts. However, because conflicts of 
interest could cause problems, the Company will 
normally resist such arrangements. 
Contractors The same considerations apply to contractors as for 
equipment suppliers. 
Fuel Supply Fuel supply companies, especially if locally based or 
Companies with strong local connections that could support the 
project, could be considered for partnerships. This 
could help assure fuel supplies, but equally it could 
restrict choice of suppliers and make it difficult to 
obtain fuel at the lowest possible price. Special cases 
may make such partnerships attractive. 
Trading Companies In the absence of special circumstances (for example, 
local knowledge or useful connections) trading 
companies, as such, offer no particular benefits as 
partners. 
Strategic Partners There could be special circumstances for specific 
and Co-devlopers partners to be taken on, sometimes as minority 
shareholders - in which case they could be considered 
as co-developers rather than partners. Examples 
includelocal banks, who could help with local 
financing and provide useful local connections; bodies 
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that give great local prestige to a project while taking 
no active part. 
Criteria for the Selection ofT.ocal Partners 
The Company's procedure for the selection of local partners includes both objective 
and subjective considerations. Candidates who fail to comply with the objective 
criteria will be eliminated. The remainder will then undergo subjective assessment 
to arrive at the final ranking. 
Objective criteria Reputation - is the candidate well established, 
respected by the local community and ethical? 
Financial - does the candidate have the funds to 
support project developments, equity and possible 
standby equity requirements? 
Politics - is the candidate apolitical? 
Fit - is the partner's culture compatible with that of the 
Company and can they accept the conditions of the JV 
agreement? 
Subjective criteria Partnership Chemistry - will the candidate work within 
the guidelines set by the JV? 
Local Influence - can the candidate help with public 
relations at national and local level? Do they have 
grass roots support? 
Government Relations - can the candidate help and 
exert influence at all levels of government? 
Future Projects - can the candidate help to secure 
future projects? 
In the previous sections, we have summarised what the management of the Company 
defined for the partner selection policy. In the next chapter, we will study the 
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Company's practical experience in selecting partners for its IJVs in some developing 
countries in Asia based on the criteria cited in the partner selection model. 
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CHAPTERV 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SHOWN BY THE CASE STUDY 
In each of the following paragraphs, we will describe in sequence the nine 
perspectives given in the partner selection model proposed in Chapter III and follow 
by a report on the approaches adopted by the Company in the case study. 
Strategic Compatibility 
Having different objectives in forming the IJV, including the timing and level of 
retums on their investments, frequently produces conflicts of interest among partners. 
As partners' objectives diverge, there is increasing risk of dissatisfaction and 
associated problems. This risk may be heightened when the IJV's environment is 
characterised by a high level of uncertainty, since, under these circumstances, changes 
in an IJV's operations are more likely. Unexpected events can cause problems 
because of a difficulty in formulating a mutually acceptable response to change. A 
power game can result and the IJV can collapse if the partners cannot reach agreement 
on an appropriate course of action. 
20 
Although determining a prospective partner's objectives is often difficult, it is an 
essential task. This analysis process should involve not only the firm's current 
situation and goals, but also scenarios of likely future stratgies. It is important to 
remember that, generally, no matter what the initial agreement on control and 
ownership may have been, environmental and strategic changes over time may alter, 
which, in tum, may well affect the original agreement. 
IJVs tend to work only as long as each partner believes it is receiving benefits or is 
likely to benefit in the relatively near future. Because of differences in goals what is 
good for one firm may be a disaster for another. A compatible partner ideally, is one 
with similar values and goals, in both a short and a long term sense. This is 
particularly critical as the stratgic stakes - size of investment, potential effect on 
corporate image, or relationship to the firm's core technologies - increase in scale. 
Looking at the case study, the "Utility-to-Utility" strategy adopted by the Company 
ensured a large degree of strategic compatibility with its partners. Even though 
electric utilities in most developing countries were state owned and differed from the 
commercial orientation of the Company, their basic objectives were similar. They 
were committed to the provision of an adequate and reliable supply of electricity to 
the local community at an affordable price. Being in the same industry, they were 
facing similar technical operating parameters. Their planning horizons were also 
similar, generally in a ten-year cycle. The business strategy of the Company was to 
invest and manage power projects in a country on a long term basis. The 
commonality thus provided for a good strategic fit. 
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However, local utilities sometimes could not offer themselves as partners because of 
some policy constraints. In one instance, the Company, failing to ally itself with the 
local electric utility, had instead entered into a JV with a U.S. private investor to 
develop a power station in India. As the project progressed, divergence in business 
strategy arose. The U.S. investor was accustomed to selling off its interest in a project 
at a high premium once the project took shape so that it could immediately realize 
profit on its development effort. This short-termism was not consistent with the 
policy of the Company to stay long term in a country where investments had been 
committed. It seemed that in this instance the Company had not researched well 
enough into the business strategy of the U.S. investor before selecting him as the 
partner. Despite this oversight, the situation did not go without remedy. The U.S. 
investor was restrained from completely exiting from the project by the JV agreement 
which provided that each party should retain for itself a minimum shareholding in the 
project company for the initial period of the venture. 
Complementary Skills and Resources 
Another primary selection criteria to be considered should be a potential partner's 
capability of providing the technical skills and resources which complement those of 
the firm seeking the partner. If prospective partners cannot provide these capabilities, 
then formation of an IJV is a questionable proposition. Therefore, technical 
complementarity should be viewed as a minimum qualification for selecting a partner. 
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Technical complementarity is determined by analyzing the key success factors - those 
few areas strongly influencing competitive position and performance - confronting the 
proposed IJV. Evaluation of a firm's current and anticipated future competitive 
position relative to these factors should then be performed. Areas where deficiencies 
exist can serve as the basis for assessing technical complementarity of a partner. 
However, the analysis should identify more than merely a financial deficiency; such 
resources may often be accessed via other options which will not entail the extensive 
managerial involvement of a partner. Although initially appealing, an IJV based 
solely on a partner's financial contributions is unlikely to foster long term 
compatibility. 
Returning to the case study, the Company was entering into an IJV with a Taiwanese 
cement producer to build, own and operate a coal-fired power station in Taiwan. This 
was made possible following the liberalisation of the electricity sector by the 
Taiwanese Government to allow foreign participation. The cement producer had no 
previous experience in power business but was interested to diversify into other 
infrastructure projects, like power generation. It therefore found the Company's 
expertise in power generation useftil in its new business initiative. On the other hand, 
the Company also found the cement producer's well established presence in the island 
instrumental in penetrating the new market. 
As part of the capital expansion programme of its core business, the cement producer 
planned to construct a large cement plant in an industrial estate in Taiwan. This 
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cement plant would be sited next to the proposed power station which would be 
jointly developed by the two partners. Due to the physical proximity of the two 
projects, the waste ash produced by the power station could be beneficially used by 
the cement plant as a resource to produce cement plant. The complementarity did not 
stop at the project level, but also extended to the technical skills and resources ofthe 
two partners. In planning the implementation of the power station project, the task 
responsibilities were allocated between the partners based on their relative expertise 
and capabilities. The responsibility split was as follows: 
The Company The Cement Producer 
Engineering Land Acquisition 
Legal and Commercial Public Relations 
Fuel Procurement Environmental Protection 
International Finance Domestic Finance & Accounting 
Insurance Human Resources & Administration 
The critical success factors for the project were engineering excellence and local 
influence. Each partner possessed one of the factors but not the other. By working 
together, they complemented each other. The above example illustrated a good choice 
of partners. 
Relative Company Size 
IJVs have the best chance of long-term success if both partners are comparable in 
sophistication and size (Blodgett 1990). Larger companies typically offer greater 
"staying power", being able to commit a greater volume and resources over a longer 
time horizon. However, IJVs between different sizes are often profitable. A smaller 
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firm may share its innovative technology with a larger firm offering finance, market, 
and distribution etc. Significant size differences can, however, lead to problems. One 
concem is the possibility of domination of one firm over the other. 
A related problem is that partner's different organisational environmentals and 
corporate cultures may work out to be incompatible (Beamish 1985). For instance, 
the bureaucratic environment of many large firms, with relatively slow decision-
making apparatuses, contrasts sharply with the more entrepreneurial and quick-
response orientation characteristic of small firms. 
Some problems arising from a difference in size can be overcome by creating a special 
environment for the IJV. For instance, the effects of parent size differences can be 
reduced by giving the UV a free hand in many activities, permitting quicker responses. 
This emphasis on autonomy is particularly appropriate for ventures which confront 
rapidly changing environments. A willingness to allow such autonomy might, 
therefore, be a consideration in the selection of a partner. 
Even if managers strongly desire partners with similar cultures, that need not restrict 
IJVs offirms ofthe same size. The relevant measure is often not about corporate size, 
but the relative size of the respective business units. Managers may, therefore, seek 
partners of similar sizes at the business or the division level and partners should, 
therefore, have similar perception of time as a vital component in the IJV's success. 
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With reference to the case study, the "Utility-to-Utility" strategy pursued by the 
Company appeared to endorse the notion that partners should be of similar size. Yet, 
under some circumstances, depending on the reason for having a partner, the 
consideration of the size of a partner might differ. For instance, when the Company 
proposed to develop a power station in India, it elected to team up with a local partner 
in order to change the common perception that the project was alien to the interest of 
the local community. The selection criteria were local presence, influence, image, 
acceptance and neutral political stance; liaison ability with the State Government; as 
well as contacts and ability ot deftly handle the press. Another distinctive criterion 
was that its size needed to be small. By being small, there was a lesser likelihood of 
conflict of interest to occur when the power station went into commercial operations 
in the later stage. 
Firiancial Capability 
When contemplating an IJV, it is imperative to ensure that the prospective partner can 
generate sufficient financial resources to maintain the venture's efforts. If a partner is 
able or unwilling to provide its share of the funding, the growth of the venture will be 
slowed. Particularly in the IJV's early stages when large negative cash flows are most 
common, the presence of a financial limit can jeopardize an entire project. It is not 
always possible to identify a company's financial limitations; however, its financial 
history and overall financial standing may well indicate potential problem areas. 
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This particular perspective has caught some attention in the case study. Besides 
allying itself with the local utility, the Company attempted to identify a separate local 
partner to jointly tackle the niche market for supplying electricity to the industrial 
estates in Indonesia. Through a commercial contact, the first independent power 
producer in the country was introduced to the Company. The producer had been 
operating a medium sized power company in an industrial estate. As part of the 
partner evaluation process, the audited financial statments of the power producer 
were obtained and submitted to the financial department of the Company for 
examination. It was found that the power generating facilities were jointly owned by a 
group of well-connected businessmen in the country. While high debt financing was 
not uncommon in this type of capital intensive project, the debt-to-equity ratio ofthis 
particular undertaking stood at an unacceptably high level. The financial department 
was concerned with this anomality and cast doubt on the power producer's capability 
to finance future power projects which would require a very high capital expenditure. 
Despite meeting the other selection criteria, the local power producer could not 
qualify as a partner without the endorsement of the financial department. 
In the end, the executive of the Company who had been promoting the power 
producer argued that while the power producer may appear to be financially deficient, 
it was nevertheless backed up by a number of prominent businessmen in the country. 
They would be able to muster the necessary funding once they were satisfied with the 
economic viability of a new project. Moreover, the Company did not regard a strong 
financial capability as an absolute requirement for a suitable partner, provided that he 
was able to provide local support and facilities. If a partner happened to be financially 
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limited, he could still play a role in the IJV as a minority shareholder. Eventually the 
power producer was admitted as a partner on probation and ajoint feasibility study for 
constructing a large power station in the country was started. 
Compatibility between Operating Policies 
Partners should be clear about the types of policy with which they will be comfortable 
working, for example, a company's code of conduct, accounting systems, and 
investment. Differences in operating approaches often result from cultural bias, and 
managers, not conscious of the existence of these bias, may take it for granted that 
there is a "right" way to do things. The compatibility of partners' operating policies 
should, therefore, be considered before an IJV is formed. Differences need to be 
ironed out at this stage to avoid severe problems later. 
In the case study, it was found that the Company's Code of Conduct made extensive 
provisions for employment practices, ethics, conflicts of interest, bribery, gifts and 
entertainment, safety, occupational health, customer relations, relations with suppliers 
and contractors, environment, responsibilities to shareholders and the financial 
community, and monitoring of compliance and the means of enforcement. To ensure 
that the Code would apply to all of its operations including its IJV undertakings, the 
Company insisted to include the most important elements of the Code into all of its JV 
agreements. Without any surprise, in countries where the laws were permissive, and 
local customs and traditions differed, the Code could rub against the customary 
business practices of some prospective IJV partners. In one instance, the Company 
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rejected an otherwise compatible partner due to a difference in opinion over the merits 
of making contributions to political parties. 
Compatible Management Teams 
In addition to agreement on operating policies, compatibility between management 
teams is an essential ingredient in the success of an IJV. Personal rapport between the 
principal decision makers is often important in the selection decision and inability of 
management to acommodate each other is frequently cited as the basis for rejecting a 
prospective partner or terminating an IJV. The essential ingredient is staff with the 
skill and intuition to spot problems before they arise, and with the competence and 
influence in their own organization to solve such problems quickly. Managerial 
compatibility can thus enhance the partners' ability to achieve consensus on critical 
policy decisions, and to overcome obstacles. An additional consideration when 
selecting a partner is, therefore, the quality and turnover of the critical personnel 
within the management team. Turnover among key management personnel can hinder 
establishment and maintenance of close relations among partners' managers 
(Anderson 1990). 
In the case study, the personal rapport between the principal decision makers was 
illustrated by the dispute resolution provision contained in a typical IJV agreement 
entered into by the Company. It provided that if any dispute arises between the 
parties, the parties will promptly make such investigation of the dispute as they deem 
appropriate before submitting the dispute to arbitration. The parties will meet, in the 
29 
first instance, by a meeting between the parties, with each party represented by the 
General Manager or higher, and will use good faith efforts to resolve the disputes. It 
was found that this was an effective dispute resolution mechanism, given that their 
respective General Managers were personally involved in the negotiation ofthe IJV in 
the first place and that their commitments to the IJV continued unabated even when 
they worked at their parent companies afterwards. 
Trust and Commitment 
Forming and operating an IJV over the long term requires more than cordial relations 
between management teams. An executive must determine whether a potential 
partner is willing and able to make the relationship work. The partner's perceived 
trustworthiness and commitment are pivotal considerations, especially ifthe proposed 
IJV involves one firm's core technologies or other proprietary capabilities which are 
the essence of the firm's competitive advantage. One approach is to seek majority 
control, and another is to structure a legal agreement to address every such 
contingency. However, these responses are unlikely to promote compatibility. Each 
partner, therefore, needs to be comfortable in believing that the other will honour the 
spirit, and notjust the letter, of the agreement. An IJV relationship is delicate at best, 
and, without fundamental trust and commitment by each party, there is little hope for a 
successful working relationship. Thought should, therefore, be given to selecting a 
suitable negotiator and support team to build good relationships and win confidence. 
30 
The case revealed that whenever the Company committed itself to a sizable IJV, it 
usually carried out a comprehensive feasibility study in conjunction with its partner. 
The study usually lasted for more than one year. There were extensive interactions 
among the staff members of the Company and its partners at all levels. In so doing, 
trust and committment were built up, although the Company did not consider this 
perspective as a separate issue, but rather as a function of all the other factors that they 
contemplated throughout the selection process. 
Mutual Dependence 
IJVs are a means of creating strengths, rather than intensifying weaknesses, by the 
partners complementing each other. Many managers view dependency on other 
organizations as undesirable, and have avoided such situations when possible. Yet, 
with proper matching, both partners should perceive a vested interest in the success of 
the IJV (Wolfgang & Kalmanoff 1961). 
Thus, there should be some identifiable mutual need, with each partner supplying 
unique capabilities or resources that are critical to success. When one partner is 
strong in areas where the other is weak, and vice versa, mutual respect is fostered, and 
conflict can be mitigated. It is usually better to choose a strong partner, as it is a 
mistake to think that a strong association can be created with a weak partner. 
A 'middle level' of dependency is the optimal (Benjamin 1987). If the level of 
dependency is too small, the IJV is unlikely to survive difficult times. However, too 
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much dependency, such as when small firms enter IJVs with much larger partners, 
may prove unstable, because of the potential consequences of the loss of a partner. 
One option to avoid the risks of dependency is to include a clause in the JV 
agreement, this may stipulate that the unilateral decision to terminate the venture 
would result ina substantial charge of some sort. 
When the case study was considered, it was found that this factor was not looked at 
during the selection process. The "Utility-to-Utility" strategy pursued by the 
Company was not designed to engender mutual dependence. By having a local utility 
as a partner, it could not be expected that the partner would depend helplessly on the 
Company's technical expertise. Even if the partner was technically deficient, he could 
easily seek technical assistance from a third party when there was a need. For non-
utility partners, the dependence on the technical expertise of the Company would only 
persist for the initial years of the operations, after that, the inexperienced partners 
could leam and take over the management and operations responsibilities in due 
course (Inkpen 1990). Conversely, being foreign to the countries in which the 
investments were made, the Company would always depend on the local partners' 
support to safeguard its interests. In the context of Asian countries where nationalism 
remained strong, the dependency on local support would not diminish even if the 
Company had operated in these countries for a long time. To mitigate this kind of 
risk, the Company usually spent a great deal of time to negotiate the JV agreement so 
that adequate financial compensation would be paid to the Company in the event of 
termination due to the default of a partner. 
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Communication Barriers 
Finally, the ease of communiction between the partners is another potential problem 
which should be considered when evaluating a potential partner's suitability. The 
greater the cultural gap between the firms forming an IJV, the more difficult it will be 
to create the necessary cohesion. Such problems can occur as a result of differences 
between national or ethnic cultures, including languages, as well as differing corporate 
cultures. Cultural differences can impede the development of rapport and 
understanding between partners (Cullen, Johnson & Sakano 1994). 
Managers of different nationalities may have differing attitudes to such basics as the 
desirabilty ofmaterial wealth, the importance of on-the-job training, or the desirability 
of change, This may lead to greater expenditures of time in negotiations, possibly 
delaying negotiations or major decisions. However, this factor should only be 
considered as a supplementary criterion, as language and culture tend not to be 
insurmountable barriers, particularly for partners from developed nations. 
When the Company considered this problem area, the differences were found to be 
minor. The mission of the Company is to become a regional utility with operations 
concentrated at several neighbouring countries in Asia. Hofstede's empirical work 
(1983) revealed that most Asian countries tend to cluster on the cultural map in the 
dimensions of power distance, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and 
masculinity-femininity. Despite Hong Kong being a cosmopolitan city with 
considerable western influence in business practices, its social traditions are well 
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entrenched in eastern values. To a large extent, the intrinsic cultural difference 
between Hong Kong and its neighbouring Asian countries in the region was small 
relative to that of a country outside the region (Westwood 1992). It was therefore 
relatively easier for the Company to develop a harmonious working relationship with 
its partners simply by a little understanding and adaptation by all concerned. 
Moreover, before the staff members of the Company interacted with their regional 
partners, most of them were required to undertake a cross-cultural orientation course. 
This arrangement further reinforced their cultural sensitivities in developing and 
operating the Company's businesses in the region. 
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CHAPTERVI 
DISCUSSIONS & CONCLUSIONS 
Success or failure of an IJV depends not only on a venture's underlying strategic 
rationale, but also, on how well partner companies can work together, despite 
differences in management styles, strategies, resources and culture. The effect of such 
corporate chemistry is difficult to predict and control but it is a critical consideration 
since JV agreements usually provide each partner with an on-going role in the 
venture's management. Compatibility of partners beyond mere technical 
complementarity is an important prerequisite for successful strategic alliance. This is 
particularly important in partner selection due to the influence this decision may have 
on the venture's operating policies and performance. 
When identifying suitable partner prospects, analysis of past ventures suggests there is 
no single approach which promises to provide optimal results in every situation 
(Friedmann & Beguin 1971; Porter & Fuller 1986). Rather, the method will be 
contingent upon the nature ofthe proposed investment. The overriding requirement in 
developing selection criteria is to ensure that a partner can offer strong prospects for 
developing an effective long term working relationship. Although satisfying the JV's 
technical requirements is a necessary element of the partner selection decision, it is 
generally not sufficient. It should also be apparent that the partners, linked together, 
35 
will form a complete business, both in terms of technical capabilities and their ability 
to interact successfully. 
The partner selection experience of the Company being revealed in this study provides 
some empirical evidence to support the relevant theoretical studies. In general, when 
the Company selects its partners, it has taken into account the nine different selection 
criteria enumerated in the partner selection model. However, further generalisation of 
the validity of the model is limited because the type of investment (large 
infrastmctural projects) pursued by the Company is rather unique and its business 
activities are restricted to a few developing countries in Asia. The investment 
uniqueness and the geographical focus may bias the disposition of the Company in 
defining its criteria for selecting partners. Furthermore, the Company has only ten 
years of IJV experience. This short length of experience makes it difficult to assess 
the relationship between the performance of the IJVs and the partner selection criteria 
chosen by the Company prior to the establishment ofthe IJVs. 
In this study, we also found that the partner selection model is geared more towards 
the situation of developed countries. Some selection criteria that are important in the 
(Context of developing countries were found to be lacking. For instance, when the 
Company was selecting local partners, it put a lot of emphasis on the partners' ability 
to negotiate with the host government. The nature of the economic system in most 
developing countries and the framework of the regulatory environment facing the 
Company makes the importance of this requirement understandable. The ability to 
negotiate with the host govenment obviously comes most readily from an indigenous 
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organization, particularly one with official links and would be a difficult skill for a 
foreign firm to master quickly [Glaister & Wang]. Although the ability to negotiate 
with the host government may be classified under the criterion of "complementary 
skills and resources", it does point to the need for further improvement to the model, 
in this instance, by incorporating relevant criteria for selecting local partners in 
developing countries. 
Despite certain inadequacy in the partner selection criteria, the model does provide a 
tool for international operating firms in structuring IJVs. Partner selection is an 
important element in the strategic alliance process for international business. By 
having a compatible partner, the probability of obtaining a more satisfactory IJV 
performance will be higher. With the benefit of the model, international operating 
firms can draw up a more structured and systematic partner selection policy based on 
theoretical researches, thereby making them more effective in using IJV as a critical 
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